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NOTES
Reexamining Compelling Interests and
Radical State Campaign Finance
Reforms: So Goes the Nation?
By MOLLY PETERSON*

Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not
the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
States....

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence
of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious
faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or
disappoint the inclination of the people.'
I.

Introduction

Recently, North Carolina businessman James A. Cartrette wrote
to his elected official, Democratic governor Jim Hunt, to express his
grievance-like most other constituents. His complaint, however, distinguishes his correspondence from the sort that representatives usually get. Angry that the $24,450 that he had given to Hunt's reelection campaign and the state Democratic party had not bought the
political appointments he believed he was promised, Cartrette wrote
and asked for his money back:
When I read.., that [someone else] had been appointed... I
lost all confidence in the system. We gave money and would
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1998; B.S.,
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, 1994. The author would like to thank
Sheila, Katie and Mike Peterson for their kitchen conversations, and especially the lawyers
whose integrity has been her example-Ronald C. Peterson and Raymond L. Sullivan.
This note is dedicated to Winifred Carreras Sullivan.
1. Tim FEDERALIST No. 57, at 390 (James Madison) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed.,
1961).
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have given more if you had asked. We... have supported you
all through your career. You misrepresented the truth to us.
We are very disappointed and feel that our money should be
returned.2
Founding father James Madison's concern with protecting the integrity of the system of government he propounded compelled him to
note that "[t]here are two methods of curing the mischiefs of [a] faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects." 3 Removing the causes of factions would require eradicating
the differences among us all-a practical impossibility. Madison believed that republican government would only lend stability to the system, not impregnability.4 Factious disruptions contrary to the
establishment of a well-functioning democratic republic would inevitably break out from time to time.5 Perhaps Mr. Cartrette's letter is just
one of those outbreaks of factious behavior; perhaps we are not as far
afield from the Madisonian vision as it would seem.
Campaign finance laws, intended to control the disproportionate
and perceived disproportionate effects of factions, are a pragmatic response to the need, recognized by Madison, to protect the quality and
integrity of our representation and reduce "instability, injustice, and
confusion." 6 Practical choices, however, are not always the foremost
choices. Often, practical choices are the "best choices," but under the
circumstances, or considering the political reality, or during a given
Presidential term. Their functionality limits their effectiveness.
At the 1984 Democratic National Convention, a potential contributor was told not to worry about contribution-limiting laws; all he
had to do, the party hack told him, was "decide how much he wanted
to give and someone would instruct him on how to make out the
checks." 7 Little has changed in the last three election cycles, a fact
often credited to public apathy.' In a New York Times poll conducted
2. The Campaign-FinanceRefund?, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Mar. 1998, at 18 (excerpting letter from James A. Cartrette to Jim Hunt).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed.,
1961).
4. See id. "A pure democracy... can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction."
Id. at 67.
5. See id.; see also JACK RA ovE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 190 (1996) ("Madison went
no further than to imply that outbreaks of factious behavior would be safely quarantined
within the boundaries of individual states.")
6. Id.
7. PmLIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy 165 (1988).
8. See John S. Shockley & David A. Schultz, The Political Philosophy of Campaign
Finance Reform as Articulated in the Dissents in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 165, 179-81 (1992). Characterizing the citizenry as apathetic
could be an understatement in two ways. Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne would
characterize the American public's attitude toward politics and campaigns even more
negatively:
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last year, 75% of adults contacted said that "many public officials
make or change policy decisions as a result of money they receive
from major contributors." 9 Thirty-nine percent of those polled said
"the system needs to be completely rebuilt;" an additional 50% said

that "fundamental changes" were necessary to fix the system.10 Only
8% wanted "minor changes." 11 "Money talks," said one respondent.
"The special-interest groups spend millions to get their point across,
and people like me aren't heard at all."12
No wonder the American public is skeptical of reform; everything
it hears from critics and sees in politicians' behavior insists that the
wrong cannot be cured by legislative action.' 3 The coincidence of the
1996 election cycle, bringing long-standing questions about the influential ability of political action committees back to the forefront, and
the investigation into contributions funneled through Asia may, how-

ever, finally bring an end to complaints about abuses of the system
and mark the beginning of actual improvement. President Clinton,
Vice President Gore, and several members of the House and Senate
are now under investigation for allegedly accepting illicit campaign

contributions funneled through Asia. 4 The Lincoln bedroom, among
other parts of the White House, likely was used for fundraising slee-

povers.' 5 When even cynical donors like Mr. Cartrette have lost faith,

we can ignore the "factious behavior" no longer.
Campaigns have become negative in large part because of a sharp decline in popular faith in government. To appeal to an increasingly alienated electorate, candidates and their political consultants have adopted a cynical stance which, they
believe with good reason, plays into popular cynicism about politics and thus wins
them votes. But cynical campaigns do not resolve issues.... Therefore, problems
get worse ....
E.J. DioNNE,JR., WHY AMEIucANs HATE POLITICS 17 (1991).
Second, some argue that historically, a system in which money buys access is the norm.
Tracing the history of American campaign financing, Bradley Smith concludes that the
problem of money as influence thus identified has always been present. "When reformers
suggest that money is 'distorting' our election process, it is not clear to what norm they
refer." Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign FinanceReform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
9. Francis X. Clines, Most Doubt a Resolve to Change Campaign Financing, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1997, at Al.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Cycles of Campaign Reform, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 10, 1997, at A22; but see Linda
Greenhouse, Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 1,
1998, § 4, at I (explaining that campaign finance reform based on "stunningly naive" premise "lies in ruins").
14. See Clines, supra note 9, at Al.
15. See id. See also Talking Reform to Death,ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Mar. 2, 1998,
at B6.
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As the legislative tool in the battle for the integrity of the system,
campaign finance laws have been de-clawed insofar as they implicate
political speech protected by the First Amendment.16 Indeed, such
political expression lies at the core of the values embodied in the First
Amendment 7 and limitations on expressions of support for candidates or issues are not to be taken lightly.' 8 As Madison argued convincingly long ago, however, our democratic process depends on our
representatives being chosen based on quality rather than finances.' 9
To the present moment, on a state and federal level, we struggle with a
way to meet these seemingly incompatible demands.2 0
Several states have incorporated public financing into their reform packages;2 ' however, partial public financing and reform
schemes born in compromise have met with mixed success in state
courts when challenged for constitutionality.2 2 Public financing for
federal and state legislative races is only one of many reforms proposed. Electronic filing with full disclosure, lowered contribution limits, campaign time limits, total voluntary spending limits, candidate
loan limits, PAC contribution bans, banning bundled contributions or
out of state contributions, restricting soft money, reduced-rate television time, contribution tax credits or deductions, and vouchers are
other reforms undertaken or suggested.' Others propose even more
16. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
18. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), rehearing denied,
393 U.S. 900 (1968).
19. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 67-78 (James Madison) (Edward Gaylord Bourne
ed., 1961).
20. See, e.g., Greg Lucas, Judge Blocks Campaign Finance Law: Limits in Prop. 208
Ruled Unconstitutional,S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1998, at Al (discussing invalidation of California's Proposition 208 contribution limits by a federal district court).
21. The idea of publicly financed elections is obviously not new; several states have
experimented with tax credits and deductions tied to contribution limits and $1 check-off
provisions, whereby taxpayers can add a dollar to their tax liability and allocate it to the
party of their choice or to the general fund. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & MUM
EBERTS, PUBLIC FINANCING OF STATE ELECTIONS: A DATA BOOK ON TAX ASSISTED
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN TwENTY STATES 5-13 (Citizens Research Foundation, 1986). Public financing's latest iteration is much more aggressive, tying
allocation of funds to candidate acceptance of contribution and campaign expenditure limits (and sometimes opponents' spending behavior). This analysis of public financing contained herein concerns this most recent round of partial public financing, especially insofar
as it provides insight into the fate of a fully publicly funded system like that of Maine.
22. See discussion infra section III.
23. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, MONEY IN POLITICS REFORM: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS, 1, 11-17 (1996) [hereinafter MONEY IN POLITICS REFORM].

Spring 1998] JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

425

radical solutions than "radical" reforms: former Senator Bill Bradley,
for one, has expressed approval of a constitutional amendment overturning Buckley v. Valeo,24 a course of action that would be as problematic as it would be arduous3 5
Until 1996, the only full public financing system at both the federal and state levels was implemented for the presidential general
election.2 6 Maine's referendum-enacted public financing law is the
most ambitious of the reforms so enacted by states. Until the Maine

Clean Election Act, full public funding of presidential general elections was the only such system on the federal or state level.2 7 And
still, presidential public financing is the only working model: with first
disbursement in Maine scheduled for the 2000 campaigns, opposition

groups are already mounting challenges to the Act on numerous
grounds. 28

During the 1996 primary election season, all candidates together

spent $237.2 million. 29 By comparison, in 1976, just after the enact-

ment of the Federal Election and Campaign Act, as amended in
197430 (hereinafter, F.E.C.A.) and the Buckley decision, spending in

the presidential primary season amounted to less than a third of
that. 31 The role of money has grown dramatically. Concurrently,
political actors' ability to circumvent the campaign spending limits has
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding limits on campaign contributions and striking individual expenditure limits).
25. See, e.g., Ellen S. Miller, Clean Elections, How To, in THE AMERIcAN PROSPECr,
Jan./Feb. 1997, at 56, 59.
26. MONEY IN PoLITICs REFORM, supra note 23, at 17.
27. See id; see also Fred W. Lindecke, Maine Law May Set the Standardfor Election
Financing,ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Jan. 20, 1997, at B5.
28. The Maine Civil Liberties Union (M.C.L.U.), for example, has claimed that the
program is "coercive" and speech-chilling, and that the requirement for seed money to
qualify for public financing harms low-income voters by forcing the public to underwrite
campaigns. See John C. Bonifaz, Whose Speech is Protected?,N.Y. TimEs, July 31, 1997, at
A23. Nathaniel Rosenblatt, a member of the M.C.L.U. board of directors, seems to argue
that more government involvement in the regulation of political speech is less viable constitutionally; he says that the changes "require a level of government involvement in political speech that violates the First Amendment." Id.
29. Federal Election Commission, Financingthe 1996 PresidentialCampaign (visited
Apr. 1, 1998) <http:llwww.fec.gov/pres96/presgenl.html>. Receipts during this period
were $243.9 million, including $42.4 million for the Clinton campaign, $44.6 million for
Dole, and a paltry $8.2 million for Perot. Federal Election Commission, Financingthe 1996
Presidential Campaign: Presidential Candidate Summary Report (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://www.fec.gov/pres96/presmstr.html>.
30. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974).
31. Federal Election Commission, Financing the 1996 PresidentialCampaign, supra
note 29, at id.
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increased steadily since Buckley gutted the F.E.C.A.3 2 Consequently,
serious doubts about the efficacy of the F.E.C.A. and similarly-written

campaign finance laws linger. Apparently also recognizing that the
causes of factionalism are here to stay, Congress has instead debated
and addressed bills aimed at limiting the effects
33 of disproportionate

access and representation, with varying results.

Early post-Buckley reforms were rudimentary, either limiting
contributions or limiting spending.34 But money trickled through the
various loopholes created by court decisions, mostly profiting party
committees, PACs and other associations. The idea that all expenditure limits are legal and all contribution limits are illegal3 s has been
undermined by trickle of money. The dichotomy relied upon by the
Court in Buckley ceased to be the decision-making "touchstone" it
once was.

36

Twenty-four years after the F.E.C.A. was last amended, the latest
round of legislative action shows the most promise yet. In the first
session of the 105th Congress, at least one hundred pending House
and Senate bills proposed changes to existing federal campaign finance laws, largely codified in the F.E.C.A.3 7 In the absence of definitive federal action, however, several states have implemented
innovative legislation, inspired by dictum in Buckley approving public
32. "Campaign finance reform lies in ruins, with money pouring into campaigns as
never before." Greenhouse, supra note 13, § 4, at 1.
33. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25, at 56, 58 (dismissing low individual contribution
limits and the McCain-Feingold campaign reform initiative as flawed alternatives).
"[T]here is no viable alternative that would bring down the cost of campaigns, free candidates and elected officials from the incessant 'money chase,' and, most importantly, end
their dependency on special-interest contributors." Id.
34. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the
FirstAmendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 381, 381-82 (1992) [hereinafter A Patternless Mosaic].
35. See, e.g., Cycles of Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1997, at A22.
36. See Lowenstein, A PatternlessMosaic, supra note 34, at 381-82.
37. See, e.g., unenacted Senate and House bills, all from the 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1997): H.R. 506 (would establish public funding for federal House of Representative
races, limiting individual contributions to $100 and allowing no more than 20% out of state
contributions); S. 179 (would loosen reporting requirements and place restrictions on
PACs), H.R. 462 (would prohibit House of Representative candidates from accepting PAC
money or contributions from outside district), H.R. 243 (would limit expenditures and create a public financing structure in House elections), H.R. 767 (would limit PAC contributions and require 65% of contributions from individuals within the district or state), S. 57
(proposed by perennial camapign finance reform champion Wisconsin Sen. Feingold, and
would provide a voluntary spending limit and partial public funding system), H.R. 493
(would limit large individual contributions as well as PAC contributions), H.R. 3485 (would
modify limits on contrbutions when candidate spends "excessively" on his own behalf), and
H.R. 419 (would create a temporary commission to study reform).
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funding approaches.3 8 These state governments finance political campaigns in a manner similar
to the federal government financing of
39
Presidential campaigns.
Such "footnote 65" approaches are being challenged in federal
and state courts for the same reasons and the same legal principles,
the Buckley appellants used to challenge the F.E.C.A. in the early
1970s-i.e., contribution and spending limits violate the First Amendment. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech no more
strongly anywhere than in the political realm.4" Laws impacting political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, where the government's interests must be compelling
and the law must be narrowly tailored to
41
effectuate that interest.
Anti-reformers now challenging state campaign finance laws and
First Amendment absolutists are correct that the First Amendment
requires the strictest scrutiny for, and the least burden imposed on,
political speech, including the giving of money for campaign spending.
But when confronted with other constitutional or otherwise fundamental interests, the greater structural integrity of the Constitution
will win out and strict scrutiny will be overcome. 42 Fundamental principles of American political theory may support a compelling government interest in making the process by which our representation is
chosen as equitable as possible. If so, narrowly tailored public financing programs can survive. This Note establishes that compelling government interests, including but not limited to preventing corruption
and the appearance thereof, support certain types of campaign finance regulation, including public financing.
Section II characterizes recognized government interests
throughout the checkered history of campaign finance reform in the
wake of Buckley. Section III outlines lessons learned from innovative
state campaign finance reform efforts and the subsequent legal challenges launched against them. Section IV presents compelling interests against the backdrop of the newly implemented reforms. Section
V examines Maine's recently-enacted Clean Election Act to determine how well a full public-financing effort is tailored to the interests
38. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65. ("Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to
abide by specified expenditure limitations.")
39. See, e.g., Lindecke, supra note 27, at B5; Miller, supra note 25, at 57. See also infra,
discussion at section III.
40. "[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17, 24-25.
42. See generally Adarand v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding federal affirmative
action programs to strict scrutiny but noting that strict scrutiny is not absolute).
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reformers are trying to protect. Finally, Section VI concludes by discussing full public financing in the context of the compelling government interests that could be used to justify the initiative against the
impending court challenge.

I.

Buckley and Its Successors: Characterizations of
Compelling Government Interests

The modern era of campaign finance laws began in 1974 with the
enactment of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (hereinafter,
F.E.C.A.), 43 as amended in the wake of President Nixon's Watergate
scandal.' In 1974 the F.E.C.A. was the first modern and most ambitious congressional attempt to regulate campaign finance.' Congress,
aware that when enacted the law would raise serious First Amendment issues, 46 included an expedited consideration provision 47 which
enabled the consolidated and wide-ranging challenge to take place
"almost before the ink of [the F.E.C.A.] had dried. ' 48 The Court's

response, Buckley v. Valeo,49 a per-curiam decision spanning 144
pages, was as wide-ranging as the law it interpreted." With minor
changes, the F.E.C.A. that emerged from that decision still haunts
Presidential and Congressional campaigns.
The Buckley Court began by observing that the F.E.C.A.'s spending limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing of presidential elections "operate in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities."'" The Court cited several significant First
43. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971), as
amended by Federal Campaign Act amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974).
44. The Act was initially passed in 1971, but was amended in 1974 before many of the
original provisions even went into effect. See Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. Nahra
argues that the financing abuses revealed by the Watergate scandal demonstrated the (perceived) need for further regulation. See Kirk J. Nahra, PoliticalPartiesand the Campaign
FinanceLaws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities,56 FopmrHM L. REv. 53, 65 (1987);
see also FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAiGN FINANCE Mrns AND REALrns 7 (1992);
Daniel M. Gillen, Buckley v. Valeo: FederalElection Campaign Reform at the Expense of
FirstAmendment Rights, 4 OHIO N.U. L. Rnv. 77, 77-78 (1977).
45. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:A Perspectiveon the FirstAmendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1053 (1985).
46. See DANIEL HAYS LowENSTnI, ELECTION LAW 507 (1995).
47. See 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (1974).
48. LOWENSTNN, supra note 46, at 507.
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. See generally 424 U.S. at 1-144. In addition to the per curiam decision, five of the
eight justices who considered the case (Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision)
added their own separate opinions totaling 59 additional pages in the reports. See Buckley,
424 U.S. at 235-294.
51. Id. at 14.
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Amendment cases 52 to support its conclusion that the dissemination of

information about and the access to candidates are crucial for the simple reason that "the identities of those who are elected will inevitably

shape the course that we follow as a nation."53

In writing that past decisions bound it to a "rigorous standard of
review,"5 4 the Court left no doubt that "critical scrutiny"'5 5 would be
applied to every provision. In fact, the language with which the Buckley Court struck down independent spending limits5 6 and mandatory

campaign spending ceilings bordered on establishing an absolute sanctity of the First Amendment. 7
Throughout Buckley the Court re-emphasized the skepticism with

which it regarded the Act's provisions in light of the First Amendment. Language in a footnote, however, tempered the otherwise criti-

cal tenor of the decision: "Congress may engage in public financing of
election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on
an agreement by the candidate to abide by specific expenditure limita-

tions."5 8 While footnote 65 approves the possibility of public financing outright, the constitutional question of the practicalities of public

financing nevertheless remains: it lies in what conditions are narrowly
tailored enough to meet compelling government interests.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that laws limiting polit-

ical speech in the campaign and election context are subject to a very
52. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (explaining broad protection is implicated by the First Amendment "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (indicating the fullest application of the First
Amendment was to conducting campaigns for public office). The Court also cited NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958), the freedom of association case, for the principle that
"[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Independent spending limits are limits on how an individual can spend her own
money on behalf of a candidate. See, e.g., CENTER FOR RnsPONsiVE POLITICS, COMING TO
TERMs: A MONY-ni-PoLmcs GLOssARY 1, 9 (1995) (defining independent expenditure
as spending money not in conjunction or coordination with a candidate or her committee
in order to expressly advocate election or defeat of a candidate). Originally, the F.E.C.A.,
as enacted in 1970, limited independent expenditures to $1000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. The independent spending limitations were invalidated because the Court said they "represent substantial rather than merely theoretical
restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech." Id. at 19.
57. See Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. Rlv. 345, 358,
373 (1977).
58. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
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critical analysis.5 9 As mentioned supra, since Buckley the Court has
held repeatedly that in cases implicating protected speech in the political realm, any government regulation burdening free speech must be
shown to be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state interests.6 °
Laws subject to this level of scrutiny include regulation of expenditure
limits on individuals, PACs, corporations and political parties, contriand public funding and associbution limits on those organizations,
61
ated inducement mechanisms.
For example, in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc.,62 the Federal Election Commission (hereinafter
F.E.C.) brought a suit against a Massachusetts right-to-life organization for publishing a pamphlet urging pro-life votes in the state primary election, in violation of a prohibition against corporate direct
expenditure in elections. 63 The Court held first that the F.E.C.A. provision prohibiting expenditures out of the corporate treasury fund by
Massachusetts Citizens For Life (hereinafter, M.C.F.L.) "in connection with any election" clearly prohibited the special flyer distributed
by the organization.6 4 In the second part of the holding, however, the
Court found that the provision clearly violated the First
Amendment.6 5
There was no question to Justice Brennan that the regulation burdened speech; "the avenue it leaves open is more burdensome than
the one it forecloses., 66 The Court engaged in a "close examination"
of the justifications is perceived for the regulation and the way the
regulation was applied to M.C.F.L.67
While acknowledging the "historical role of contributions in the
corruption of the electoral process," the Court pointed out that the
existence of other means "more narrowly tailored and less burdensome" to achieve the same ends made the Act's provision unconstitutional.68 The government "must curtail spending only to the degree
necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid in59. See, e.g., Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. at 484; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966).
60. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,783-84 (1978), reh'gdenied, 438
U.S. 907 (1978) (striking limitations placed on corporate spending to express positions on
ballot initiatives).
61. Disclosure requirements, a system by which election authorities publicize which
donors have given what money to which candidate, were upheld unconditionally by the
Buckley Court. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-83. I will leave those aside for clarity's sake. For
the Court's holding regarding disclosure requirements, see id.
62. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
63. Id. at 244-45.
64. Id. at 245-48.
65. See id. at 255-63.
66. Id. at 255.
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id. at 260-61.
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fringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted
regulation." 6 9 A desire for a bright-line rule may be admirable; however, it is not compelling enough to restrict speech.7 °
On behalf of the majority, Justice Brennan wrote that "[d]irect
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide
an unfair advantage in the political marketplace."' 7 1 Brennan noted
that even if the idea of "political free trade" suggested that not everyone had to have an equal share of the resources, corporations' resources only represent investors' economic interests, not their political
voice. 72 "The availability of these resources may make a corporation
a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas." 73 With those
words, Justice Brennan recognized the unease Americans already
shared about money's ability to augment political speech. However,
he stopped well short of explicitly rendering that unease into a compelling interest.
Next, in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee (hereinafter N.C.P.A.C.),74 the Court
struck down regulations limiting contributions by associations on the
grounds that independent expenditures are "at the core of the First
Amendment." 75 The Court analogized the freedom to use money to
the ability to amplify one's speech: "allowing the presentation of views
while forbidding the expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them
is much like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views
while denying him the use of an amplifying system. ' 76 In allowing
independent expenditures, the Court did recognize the "substantial"
amount of money spent on communicating ideas through "sophisticated" advertising campaigns.7 7 The Court then did more than follow
in the footsteps of the Buckley Court's analysis. It overstated Buckley's holding, "reaffirming" that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption are the "only" legitimate and acceptable
government interests. 78 By the mid-eighties, the sands had shifted.
A case arising from the 1976 Michigan Campaign Finance Act 79
69.
70.
we are
71.
72.

Id.
Id. (stating that we "must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as
against its sweeping restriction").
Id. at 257.
See id. at 257-58.

73. Id. at 258.
74. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
75. Id. at 493.
76. Id.
77. 1d

78. Id. at 496-97.
79. MIcH. CowP.

LAWS ANN. § 169.255

(West 1989).
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provided another opportunity for the Supreme Court to address the
issue of group expenditures. In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce,"° Justice Thurgood Marshall reasoned that the members
of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce were more like shareholders
of a corporation than were the members of the M.C.F.L. 1 Chamber
members paid dues, possessed diverse interests and purposes that
were not necessarily political, and were essentially a conglomeration
of business interests whose penchant for direct corporate spending
was the exact evil at which the statute was aimed."2 Because the goal
of the statute was to prevent corporate campaign spending that would
violate the political expression rights of minority shareholders, the
similarity in makeup of the Chamber of Commerce to a corporation
meant that the law was narrowly tailored to the problem. 3 Marshall
further distinguished the Michigan Chamber of Commerce from unions, which are unincorporated, and media corporations, which play
the watchdog role of the press and therefore are worthy of being excepted from an otherwise blanket rule. 4
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion called the majority "Orwellian,"8 5 and said it was guided by the principle that "too much speech
is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe."8 6 The majority
contended that while speech was burdened, it was not snuffed completely; corporations could still expressively act by setting up separate
funds through which to give. 7 In fact, Justice Marshall asserted that
this channeling of speech is the ideal, because it ensures that "the
speech generated accurately reflects contributors' support for the corporation's political views."8 8
The compelling government interest identified by the Court in
Austin is the prevention of corruption of the political system through
the regulation of corporate expressive activity.8 9 Justice Marshall
found the regulatory provision "precisely" tailored to the end of eliminating corruption. 90
80. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
81. Id. at 662-65.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 665-68.
85. Id. at 678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. Justice Scalia's opinion began: "Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of
elections by preventing disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful
group, your Government has decided that the following associations of persons shall be
prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any candidate: __
." Id.

87. See id. at 660.
88. Id. at 660-61.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 661.
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However, the corruption identified in Austin seems to differ from
the Buckley Court's more simple construction. Informed by the malapportionment of expressive activity power favoring corporations
over individuals, Justice Marshall's corruption also incorporated elements of the need to put a brake on spiraling costs and the equalizing
rationale expressing a desire to level the playing field-both recognized by the Buckley Court as "ancillary" 9' interests. By 1990, when
Austin was decided, the sands had shifted once more.
Based on Supreme Court precedent, strict scrutiny applies to
campaign finance reform proposals; consequently, determining which
compelling government interests can support such proposals necessarily precedes determination of the proposals' legality. Buckley's discussion of these interests centered on corruption.9 2 The Austin Court
picked up on that language and restated it incorrectly asserting that
corruption is the only concern, 93 as did the court in NCPAC.9 4 In the
M.C.F.L. case, the Court relied on a similar kind of corruption as a
sole government interest, but did not characterize it as exclusive. 95
Finally, the Court's most recent campaign finance decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission96 indicates a continuation of broad protection for political speech under the First Amendment, especially in the electoral
context. The Court struck down limitations on independent expenditures by political parties, despite an F.E.C. policy allowing the limits
based on the presumption that parties are incapable of spending
money independently,9 because the Court held that a governmental
presumption of a characteristic does not render that characteristic
present, especially concerning such a basic right as the right to free
speech. 9 "We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a
different direction," 99 Justice Breyer wrote. Falling back on legislative history to reemphasize the importance of parties, the Court dis91. 424 U.S. at 25.
92. 424 U.S. at 25-26 (finding it "unnecessary" to look beyond primary purpose of the
F.E.C.A. for justification).
93. 494 U.S. at 660-61.
94. 470 U.S. at 496-97.
95. 479 U.S. at 256-58.
96. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). A Republican party fund-raiser, describing how to circumvent the law to make the most of party-financed advertising: "So we have a little dance
where we dance around the law in a way that never breaks the letter but breaks the spirit
of the law, but we don't agree with the law anyway." STERN, supra note 7, at 165.
97. See id. at 619-22.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 616. Later, Breyer noted that no record evidence nor legislative materials
suggesting corruption related to independent party expenditures was presented by the
F.E.C. Id. at 2316.
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missed the "constitutionally insufficient" desire to reduce wasteful
spending as not compelling enough. 100
Making corruption the only justifiable interest could be the
equivalent of establishing a standard "strict in theory, fatal in fact"
similar to the one Justice Marshall characterized in Fullilove v. Klutznick'0 ' in the equal protection context-depending on how broadly or
narrowly corruption is characterized. If other state interests do exist,
however, or if corruption is painted more broadly, that danger-that
no campaign finance reform could ever exist-is decreased
significantly.
In looking for a compelling government interest, the Buckley
Court found it unnecessary to go beyond the primary justification
cited by the parties, namely the "prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions."'' 0
"Ancillary" interests also touched on in Buckley, like the equalization
of citizens' access to the political process and the limitation of the
"skyrocketing" cost of campaigning, were largely ignored, both by the
Buckley Court and the subsequent courts in their characterizations of
compelling interest. 103 However, these until-now overlooked interests
are subject to resurrection. In addition, the preservation of representatives' time for the job of representing rather than soliciting campaign
funds, has also been argued recently.' 4 This interest, not yet directly
addressed by the Supreme Court, has been implicated in at least one
recent state court decision. 0 5
Justice Louis D. Brandeis once called the states "laboratories of
reform."'0 6 State government responses to public funding mechanisms illustrate well the ever-changing relationship between the regulation of campaign funding and the justifications for those laws. The
laws and court rulings of these laboratory states represent cutting
edge First Amendment political speech jurisprudence. These values
have been implicated to varying degrees in several recent state court
07
decisions in Missouri, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Kentucky.
Through the state court interpretations of legislative reform efforts,
100. Id. at 618.
101. 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. 424 U.S. 1, 25.
103. See id. at 25-26.
104. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1281, 1282 (1994).
105. See Rosensteil v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996).
106. Herbert E. Alexander, Introduction, in CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND REALrrvIN THE STATES 1, 13 (Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1976).
107. See infra Part III.
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the interests that are compelling and the type of programs tailored to
those interests that are supportable under the First Amendment can
be discerned.
III. Lessons Derived from "Radical" State Reforms
If there were once lingering questions about the practicality and
efficacy of "footnote 65" financing on any level, the several states that

have enacted partial public financing and similar reforms for state representative positions have put such doubts to rest. Congress has often
begun talking seriously about reforms, but has not completed any
since the post-Buckley amendments. 108 While Congress may have
missed a golden opportunity by failing to provide for federal representatives' public funding, 10 9 these states have picked up the fallen

standard by employing variable contribution limits," 10 partial public
financing,"' and cap gaps. 1' 2
All of these reforms similarly grant benefits to candidates who

voluntarily limit amounts of campaign contributions.' 13 The way the
federal and state courts examine the nexus between the compelling
interest and the reform measure tailored to serve that interest indicates the viability and elasticity of the interests themselves. In the

wake of Maine's newly-enacted full public financing scheme, these
state laws which formerly represented the outer limits of reform can

serve as a starting point for the future. Thus, while Buckley provided
the basic framework, campaign finance laws in Missouri, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Kentucky now demonstrate that the Buckley-born

bright lines of campaign finance have blurred because of the changing
landscape of campaign finance.
108. See Dane Strother, CampaignFinance 'Reforms' Don't Work, N.Y. Tnvms, Feb. 1,
1997, at A19.
109. See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:Is the FirstAmendment
an Obstacle to Political Equality?, in LAw AND LIBERALISM IN iB 1980s 1, 2 (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1991).
110. Variable contribution limits "allow[ ] candidates who comply with voluntary campaign spending limits to accept contributions in larger amounts than non-complying candidates are allowed to accept." COMING To TERMs: A MoNEY-IN-PoLrIcs GLOssARY,
supra note 56, at 36.
111. Partial public financing occurs when part of a candidate's funding comes from the
government, usually through matching funds to the private funds raised. See id. at 34.
112. "Cap gaps" describe the difference in limits on either total campaign spending or
expenditures when a public financing system is in place. Those who comply with requirements are given higher limits on dollar amounts. See Vote Choice v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26,
39 (1st Cir. 1993); see also generally Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F.Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995);
Rosensteil v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
113. See MONEY IN PoLTcs REFoRm, supra note 23, at 11-17.
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Like many state-born reforms, Missouri's legislation originated in
a popular initiative. After the state assembly passed a different contribution limits bill, voters ratified Proposition A, shrinking individual
and group contributions to $100 per election cycle per candidate in
small districts, $200 14
per cycle per candidate in larger districts, and
$300 for state races.
In Carver v. Nixon," 5 the Eighth Circuit overturned a district
court ruling that these individual campaign contribution limits were
constitutional." 6 While obviously recognizing Buckley's preeminence
and the premium it placed on political speech, the Carver district
court relied heavily on Buckley, which it characterized as saying that
"even a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained so long as the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment" of constitutional expressive rights. 1 7 The
district court, with little elaboration, found that Missouri "clearly" had
an interest in contribution limits. The appellate court held that the
limits were not narrowly tailored to effectuate the interest of the state
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption." 8 While
quoting the same passage from Buckley concerning the possibility of
supporting a significant interference with expressive rights, the Eighth
Circuit commented that just postulating the existence of a compelling
interest does not render it a reality" 9 -leaving open the possibility
that such interests do, in fact, exist.
Then, in a closely related case, Shrink Missouri Government PAC
v. Maupin, 2 ° the court scrutinized the remainder of the ballot initiative provisions and state senate laws unchallenged by Carver for impermissible restrictions of political speech. 2 ' Under the statute, a
Missouri state-office candidate could file an affidavit of willingness to
comply with spending limits. 2 2 Compliance would entitle the candidate to accept contributions from PACs, parties, unions, corporations
114. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.100, repealed by L. 1997, S.B. No. 16 § A. According to the
interpretation of the state attorney general at the time, the more restrictive provision controlled-in this case, the ballot initiative.
115. 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
116. Id. at 645.
117. 882 F.Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
118. See id.
119. 72 F.3d 633, 638. This language perhaps foreshadowed the Colorado Republicans
opinion the next year.
120. 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1424.
122. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 130.052.1, 130.052.3, repealed by L. 1997, S.B. No. 16 § A.
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and other candidate's committees, while non-compliant candidates
could only accept contributions from individuals.'"
The same panel, having held in Carver that spending limitations
and prohibition of carryovers from one campaign to another violated
the First Amendment, 2 4 upheld the district court's conclusion that total-campaign spending limits, limits on how much a candidate could
give to his own campaign, and carryover provisions were not narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling state interests cited.'" The appellate
court further held that the state of Missouri could not characterize as
an incentive what had been a preexisting entitlement.' 2 6
The Maupin district court had relied heavily on Buckley as controlling authority. 2 7 It found candidate self-contribution limits' 1 8
clearly unconstitutional under Buckley.' 2 9 It noted that Buckley upheld voluntary spending limits "only where the reward for adhering to
the limits was the receipt of public campaign financing. " 3° And it
stated that where spending limits stop acting as inducements (or car(sticks), even public financing-conrots) and serve instead as threats
3
nected limits cannot be legal.' '
The district court in Maupin applied the First Amendment barrier
more absolutely' 3 2 than the district court had in Carver just two
months earlier. 3 3 While the Maupin district court recognized that
"negative campaigning does not benefit the public discourse" and that
"expenditures of unlimited amounts of money... is not a sensible use
of society's resources,"' 134 the laws in question were not sufficiently
123. See id.
124. Carver, 72 F.3d at 645; see Maupin, 71 F.3d at 1428-29.
125. See Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Mo.
1995).
126. See Maupin, 71 F.3d at 1425. "The limits are not voluntary because they provide
only penalties for noncompliance rather than an incentive for voluntary compliance." Id.
127. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. at 1250-52. The appellate court noted that the district court's
opinion was "well-reasoned." 71 F.3d at 1423.
128. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.011(12)(a) defines self-contribution to include "[a] candidate's own money or property used in support of his candidacy other than expense of his
food, lodging, travel, and payment of any fee necessary to the filing for public office." Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 130.011(12)(a) (West Supp. 1998).
129. See Maupin, 892. F. Supp. at 1251.
130. Id. at 1252.
131. See id.; see also Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993); Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994).
132. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. at 1256.
133. The district court decided Carver,882 F. Supp. 901 (1995), on April 18 and Maupin
on July 7. See 892 F. Supp. at 1246. Carver was appealed, and the Eighth Circuit opinion
was decided on December 19, 1995. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (1995).
134. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. at 1256.
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narrowly tailored to withstand political speech scrutiny.'3 5 In both
cases, however, the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's
holding cemented a nearly insurmountable First Amendment barrier.
Oddly, the Maupin district court listed all four of the compelling interests cited by the plaintiffs-preserving election integrity, preventing
corruption, preventing false statements, and promoting individual participation in the election process-and commented that "[a]s political
' 13 6
or policy goals these statements cannot be seriously argued with.'
What has happened in Missouri provides positive indicia for implementation of future reforms elsewhere. First, the courts acknowledged compelling interests beyond simple corruption; this could signal
a move away from strict formalism and an acknowledgment of the
problems plaguing the system since Buckley. Second, and on a more
cautionary note, the distinction drawn between a permissible inducement encouraging participation, an unjust punishment for noncompliance, and a protected mode of communication in running for office is
a close one, and should be viewed with trepidation. It is not yet clear
at which point voluntarily accepted spending limits turn into an unfairly induced requirement; however, it is apparent that falling into
the latter category renders reforms ready for attack.
B.

Minnesota's Partial Public Financing: Attacking the PACs

Minnesota's campaign finance reform history is longer than that
of most states. Public financing has been in place there since 1976 and
was amended most recently in 1996.17 The overwhelming majority of
candidates signed on to Minnesota's plan from the very beginning. 3 '
By 1992, 97% of state legislative candidates filing for office agreed to
the public financing scheme in place since the 1988 elections, 39 the
stated goal of which was to "enhanc[e] the public's confidence in the
political process by ensuring the viability of the legislature's statutory
scheme."' 4 ° PACs and party associations, not surprisingly, bore the
135. Id. at 1251 (striking limits on candidates' own funds); id. at 1253 (striking spending
limits); id. at 1254 (striking provision limiting carryover of funds from one campaign to
next); id. at 1256 (striking provision that would add "approved and authorized by" to political advertisements).
136. Id. This is strange considering the narrowness with which it applied language from
Buckley regarding compelling government interests.
137. Rosensteil v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1547 (8th Cir. 1996); Day, 34 F.3d at 1358.
138. See Rosensteil, 101 F.3d at 1564. The candidate participation rate "bottomed out"
at 66% in 1980. Id.
139. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1361 (citing MIN. E-ncaL PRAcrncns BoARiD, ETHICAL
PRACncEs BOARD IssuEs SUMMARY OF 1992 CAMPAIGN FIN. REP. FOR STATE CANDIDATES, POL. COMMITTEES, AND POE. FUNDs 2 (July 2, 1993)).
140. Id. at 1361 (citing appellee's brief).
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brunt of the regulatory action as the main targets.' 4 '
After Minnesota's 1992 reforms, several different associations
challenged the public funding provisions limiting independent expenditures for campaigns that remained privately financed. 42 In particular, one regulation applied when an independent association
communicated beyond its dues-paying membership with non-member
voters. The regulation would increase a publicly-funded candidate's
expenditure limit in an amount equal to the independent expenditure
supporting the candidate or slinging mud at the candidate's opponent.' 43 Further, the candidate who had complied with the voluntary
public spending provisions would receive up to half the independent
association's expenditure amount in the form of public financing.'4
The Eighth Circuit, in Day v. Holahan, permanently enjoined these
provisions from ever taking place, finding that the contribution limit
of $100 was so low that it infringed on protected political speech and
associational rights under the First Amendment. 4 5
Again faced with a First Amendment political speech challenge,
the Eighth Circuit panel that found Minnesota's reforms constitutional in Rosensteil v. Rodriguez did so even while the state legislature
was amending the 1992 reforms.' 4 6 Advocating the state financing
limits, chair of the state Ethical Practices Board Carolyn Rodriguez
argued that the cap gaps were "provided to encourage maximum candidate participation in [the state's] public financing of political campaigns" and were strictly voluntary. 4 7 The court found such interests
48
compelling and likely to be achieved through the regulations.
Statutory provisions controlling speech and targeting the factions
themselves rather than the candidates can thus survive. Further, benefits conferred on campaigns accepting limitations and public financing simply aimed at leveling the playing field fall squarely within the
category of permissible inducements. Only time will tell whether the
reforms as enacted cure the mischief of Minnesota's factions.
141. See, e.g,. MIN. STAT. § 10A.27.1 (1993), Min . STAT. ANN. § 10A.27.1 (West
1996) (providing voluntary limit on candidate receipt of PAC contributions); see also Day,
34 F.3d at 1365-66 (invalidating Minnesota's $100 limit on contributions from individuals
and PACs).
142. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1358-59.
143. See MrqN. STAT. § 10A.25 subd. 13 (1993).
144. See id.
145. Day, 34 F.3d at 1361.
146. Rosensteil, 101 F.3d at 1548.
147. Id. at 1550.
148. See id. at 1552-53. Since candidates can choose funding which, in their opinion, "is
most advantageous to their candidacy," the Eighth Circuit held that "the State's scheme
promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment values." Id. at 1552.
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C. Wisconsin's Aggregated Committee Limits: "Not a Dichotomy, But
a Spectrum"
Because Wisconsin's campaign finance reform approach does not
fit easily into the expenditure/contribution dichotomy, it highlights
some of the shortcomings of post-Buckley First Amendment jurisprudence associated with campaign finance reform. Wisconsin Statutes
section 11.26(9)(a) lumps together money received from all "committees"-including PACs, parties, and campaign committees-into one
aggregate, cappable total that, if violated, allows opposition candidates to receive more public money than they would otherwise be eligible to receive. 14 9 State legislative candidate John Gard, his
campaign committee, and other Wisconsin state legislators and their
campaign committees, together challenged the constitutionality of the
campaign finance laws after the state election enforcement agency
sought damages for violations of the spending cap. 150
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
PAC-to-candidate contribution limits by finding the law narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest in preventing undue and
corrupt influence by committees. 151 The court distinguished the limitations on money in section 11.26(9)(a) from an absolute limitation on
speech, since the limitations in question were directed at committees'
giving to the candidate, and did not constitute an absolute cap on the
amount of money the candidate could spend.' 52 Characterizing the
statute's effects as "marginal," the Wisconsin court pointed out that
according to the Buckley interpretation, "even a 'significant interference' with constitutionally-protected rights could be sustained under
the right circumstances.' 53 As a mitigating factor, candidates could
still receive endless funding from "other individuals, from their own
sources, and from individuals through other sources such as conduits."' 5 4 The court used legislative history to find that the evil the
law was written to attack was committee access to legislators; "narrow
149. Wis. STAT. § 11.26 provides in pertinent part:
No individual who is a candidate for state or local office may receive and accept
more than 65% of the value of the total disbursement level determined under
§11.31 for the office for which he or she is a candidate during any primary and
election campaign combined from all committees subject to a filing requirement,
including political party and legislative campaign committees.
Wis. STAT. § 11.26(9)(a)(1986). Section 11.31 creates limits for candidates who accept public financing; the percentage taken in § 11.26(9)(a) above is taken from the amount, different for every office, in this section. Wis. STAT. §§ 11.26(9)(a), 11.31.
150. See Gard v. Wisconsin State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 982 (1990).
151. See id. at 813.
152. See id. at 816, 819.
153. Id. at 817.
154. Id. at 819.
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interest groups have a corrupting influence on individual
candidates."' 5 5
The statutes primarily targeted PACs, with the current regulations intended to close those loopholes.156 For example, other sections near section 11.26(9)(a) further restricted PACs. They limited
the percentage PAC contributions could make up of the candidate's
total financing 5 7 and the amount of money a party-related committee
could receive from PACs; 58 they also prohibited designation of contributions to state parties by PACs for specific campaigns or candidates.' 59 The court pointed out that "there would be a potential for
undue domination of a candidate's campaign by narrow interest PAC
contributions if party-related committees were not restricted in their
ability to contribute to an individual candidate."' 6 0 The court found
that the other anti-PAC measures were not enough;
"effective and
16 1
comprehensive contribution limits [were] required.'
Citing M.C.F.L., the Gard court also stated that the aggregatecommittee-spending cap was a limit on contributions and not expenditures. 1 62 Whether or not an aggregate spending limit is a contribution
cap, rather than a limit on expenditures, however, is far from clear.' 6 3
As a result, the Gard decision suggests a strong argument for
moving away from the First Amendment jurisprudence established in
Buckley. The contribution/expenditure dichotomy, established by the
F.E.C.A., approved by Buckley, and continued in subsequent cases,
becomes a blurry and therefore unwieldy distinction when the aggregate limit includes both expenditures and contributions.
Lowenstein argues that "the contribution limit/expenditure limit
contrast is not a dichotomy after all, but a spectrum.'1 64 Indeed,pragmatic concerns increasingly require that the distinction between expenditures and contributions, artificial from the start, be de155. Id. at 822.
156. See id.
157. See Wis. STAT. § 11.26(9)(b).
158. See id. §§ 11.26(8)(a), 11.265(2). A party-related committee is described in the
opinion as a "legislative campaign committee." 456 N.W.2d at 812; see also id. §§ 11.01(4),
11.05 (setting out definitions).
159. See id.§8 11.16(4) (prohibiting "earmarking"), 11.30(1) (prohibiting "laundering") (1984).
160. Gard,456 N.W.2d at 824.
161. Id. at 823-24.
162. Id. at 817-18.
163. There is a wide range of scholarly opinion on this topic. For an opinion that aggregate limits are expenditure limits, see Lawton Chiles, PACs: Congress on the Auction
Block, 11 J. OF LEGIs. 193, 213 (1984). Others have asserted, like the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, that aggregate limits are contribution limits since they affect even the smallest contributions. See Fred Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics,22 ARiz. L.
Rv. 603, 625 (1980).
164. Lowenstein, supra note 34, at 417 (citation omitted).
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emphasized. To see aggregate limits in absolute terms, as either a contribution or expenditure cap, is a mistake; the implemented effects of
either one can range from overwhelmingly good and effective to arbitrary and deleterious. 16 5 Forcing aggregate limits to fit into the Buckley categories is thus inconsistent with the rationale of Buckley
requiring precision in analyzing and implementing limits, because such
limits possess elements of both expenditures and contributions, without actually being entirely either one. Focusing on money's status as
either a contribution or as an expenditure is disingenuous, and should
be relegated to a secondary indicator at best; the primary focus should
be the relationship between the means and the end.
Paced by Senator Russ Feingold's nearly futile efforts to enact
federal reforms as well as the state efforts litigated in Gard, Wisconsin
remains on the cutting edge of reforming campaigns. It is not alonesince Gard validated the aggregate limit, at least five other states have
implemented a similar measure. 166 What makes these reforms successful as pragmatic responses is their drafters' unwillingness to pigeonhole reforms in an artificial category. Wisconsin's reform, while
creative, is classical in its narrow nexus between the interest acknowledged and the right affected. As shown in Wisconsin, distancing statutory language from Buckley's binary structure is one way to escape the
complex ramifications of Buckley's muddled opinion.
D.

Kentucky: The Failure of Excessively Large Gaps Between
Candidate's Caps

In Wilkinson v. Jones,'6 7 a federal district court confronted Kentucky campaign finance provisions implemented after, and similar to,
those in Wisconsin. The provisions, aimed at encouraging public financing of Kentucky state-office campaigns, triggered higher expenditure limits for publicly-funded campaigns whose opponents did not
accept the voluntary spending limits' 68 and set higher individual con165. See id. at 424. Lowenstein further argues that no clean way to separate the good
limits from the bad exists. Id.
166. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-905 (West 1989); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85305
(1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-205 (West 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1505.2 H(7)
(West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-218 (1989).
167. 876 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
168. Publicly-funded campaigns agreed to limit private contributions in each of the primary cycle and the actual campaign cycle to $600,000, with 2-to-1 matching grants of $1.2
million, for a total spending limit of $1.8 million. See Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 121A.030(1),
121A.060(2) (Michie 1996). This limit would then be rendered moot if the qualifying candidate's opponent spent more than $1.8 million, and the publicly-funded candidate could
continue to raise and match funds. See id. §§ 121A.030(5)(a), 121A.060(2)(c),
121A.080(4), 121A.080(5).
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169
tribution limits for those publicly-funded campaigns.
"The knowledge that a candidate who one does not want to be
elected will have her spending limits increased and will receive a public subsidy equal to half the amount of the independent expenditure,
as a direct result of that independent expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected speech."' 7 0 The Wilkinson district court distinguished the Minnesota trigger provision, because Kentucky's
provision applied only when the candidate made an affirmative decision to expand the campaign budget beyond $1.8 million. 7 Further,
the Kentucky public funds were only available to the candidate when
additional private contributions are made. 7 2 However, the court
went on to find that the trigger provision would accomplish the compelling governmental interests of promoting
New York Times v. Sulli1 73
van-style speech, not inhibiting it.
It nevertheless found the "cap gap" not narrowly tailored to the
interests at hand. 1 74 That provision lowered the contribution limit to
$100 for privately-funded candidates, as compared with $500 for candidates volunteering to participate in the public-funding system. 7 5
According to the Wilkinson court, the low $100 limit constituted a
penalty, its differential ratio too high at five to one. 7 6 Although the
court invalidated the law, it did accept77 that, at least in theory, a cap
gap could pass constitutional muster.'

IV.

Pushing the Limits: Reassessing "Ancillary" Compelling
Government Interests

Understanding American government's objective and applying it
in a modern context is crucial to tailoring reform programs that pass
constitutional muster. James Madison explained:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in
the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public
169. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 121.050 (Michie 1996). The Wilkinson court lays out the
statutory scheme in full at the beginning of its opinion. 876 F. Supp. at 920-21. See also
generally Ky.REv. STAT. ANN.§ 121, 121A (Michie 1996).
170. Day, 34 F.2d at 1360.
171. See Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928-29.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 928 ("It occurs to this court that the trigger provision promotes more
speech, not less").
174. Id.
175. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 121A.050 (Michie 1996).

176. 876 F. Supp. at 929-30.
177. See id. at 929.
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1 78

Reformers who would implement campaign finance laws in the
face of First Amendment strict scrutiny review have been forced to
search for alternate justifications amounting to compelling state interests. Increasingly, preventing corruption and the appearance thereof
has become a wobbly foundation on which to rest campaign finance
reform. 17 9 In the absence of the striking down of Buckley or a largescale overhaul of the F.E.C.A., the success of future legislative efforts
both at the federal and state levels will depend on legislators' ability
to articulate and incorporate alternate justifications that have not yet
been rejected. Equality and representative time management concerns are two of many such interests that have not yet been fully
explored.
A. Equal Access to the Political Process

Arguably, political dialogue requires ensuring that "everyone
gets an equal allocation of time and a fair chance to express his point
of view."180 However, application of this principle to campaign finance laws is tricky. Members of the Court who acknowledge the
power of money to influence the political process have been reluctant
to limit the money because of the blurred distinction between access
to speech and the speech itself,' and this reluctance has undermined
momentum for leveling the playing field.
In Buckley, the Court commented that "[a] restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."' 82 Although the
Buckley Court thus came very close to equating money with speech,
scholars and various subsequent courts have retreated from that formulation in recent years. Justice J. Skelly Wright, for example, has
178. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed., 1961).
179. See supra discussion at Section III.
180. ELIZABETH DREw, MONEY AND POLITICS 149 (1983).
181. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18. "Being free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as
far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. However, later in the per
curiam opinion, the Court noted that "[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor
does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." Id. at 21. But Chief Justice
Burger noted in his concurring opinion that limiting contributions would have the same
practical effect as limiting expenditures if in fact the limitations on money equaled the
limitations on speech. See id. at 241 (Burger, J., concurring). Justice White specially noted
in his concurrence that "money is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in the
context of political campaigns." Id at 263 (White, J., concurring).
182. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
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long been skeptical of the Court's decision in Buckley, 18 3 particularly
of its money-speech equation." 4 Still, to the extent that campaign finance regulation equalizes that which the state should not manipulate,
Buckley renders such regulation unconstitutional. 5
Equality of opportunity to influence the political process, sometimes characterized as "leveling," should be recognized as a constitutionally compelling governmental interest. 6 The leveling rationale
can be further subdivided into "straight leveling" and "proportional
leveling." Proportional leveling "permits government to require that
expenditures from a political fund be in proportion to the views of
those who contribute to the fund"'1 7 but is nonetheless subject to derision for its "slippery slope" tendencies. Straight leveling "has the
beauty of egalitarian purity;"'8 8 but, taken to its extreme, would necessitate overruling Buckley and allowing all limits, even on individuals' independent expenditures-the type of spending most clearly
protected by the Buckley Court's analysis. Considering the political
impracticality of either type of leveling and the certain unconstitutionality of the straight leveling rationale, the lack of a palatable alternative could suggest that proponents of campaign finance reform would
be better off staying away from these types of rationales altogether. 9
Modern political philosopher John Rawls' balancing of the principles driving First Amendment jurisprudence and the principles driving
our fundamental notions of public representation is pragmatic; as
Rawls puts it, "[t]he First Amendment no more enjoins a system of
representation according to influence effectively exerted in free political rivalry between unequals than the Fourteenth Amendment en183. Wright has noted wryly that his skepticism is partially attributable to the fact that
the Court overrules his District Court's opinion in its per curiam decision in Buckley. See
Wright, supra note 109, at 94 (quoting Wright's circuit court opinion in Buckley, 519 F.2d
821, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in part,424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
184. See J. Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE LJ.
1001 (1976). Members of the court frequently have written to agree. See, e.g., 424 U.S. at
concurring);
244 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 261 (White, J.,
id. at 290 (Blackmun, J.); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politdissenting).
ical Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
185. The Buckley Court found parts of the F.E.C.A. invalid: "Although the Act does
not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, it is aimed
in part at the equalizing of the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by
placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups." 424 U.S.
at 17.
186. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions:Recent
Experience, Public Choice Theory, and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505
(1982); Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Campaign Financingand Equal Protection,26 STAN.L.
Rnv. 815 (1974).
187. RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH rN AN OPEN SocIETY 237 (1992).
188. Id. at 238.
189. See id. at 239.
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joins a system of liberty of contract and free competition between
unequals in the economy."1 9 Rather than requiring free debate between equals, Rawls demands a minimum condition of "background
justice" as a prerequisite for the competition in both the electoral ring
and the economic market. 191
Rawls' objection to the status quo is more nuanced than corruption; he notes that the role of money in the political system at present
is such that it is "inconsistent with both the philosophical meaning and
the practical exercise of political equality. '192 Rawls has also argued
that "valid claims of equal citizens are held within certain standard
limits by the notion of a fair and equal access to the political process
as a public facility."' 193 In a constitutional democracy where all adults
have the right to engage in political affairs, Rawls' principle of participation not only requires equal access but also engenders the type of
"fair rivalry" for elected office reformers desire.' 94
The Court has agreed, to an extent. In Reynolds v. Sims, 195 a
voting-rights case, the Court found that "[f]ull and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires... that each citizen
has an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature."' 96 What the Court was upholding in Reynolds was not
just the right to vote, but the right of access to the whole process.
Without that access, other basic rights may not be sufficiently protected. 9 7 Further, taken to the logical extreme, such disenfranchisement of non-contributing voters at the hands of contributing
individuals, associations, and corporations creates a general voter demeanor of apathetic cynicism, 198 since the public recognizes that a basic justice is missing from the political system.' 99

190. John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, 3 Tim TANNER LEcrRums ON
HUMAN VALuES 78 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982). Rawls seems to think Buckley will
be outmoded much in the same way Lochner has been. See id.
191. See id. "Background justice" was first defined by Rawls in his A Theory of Justice.
JOHN RAwEs, A THEORY OF JusrcE 83-89 (1971). Briefly, it refers to the establishment of
underlying or preceeding conditions the existence of which guarantees a fair procedure
and, in conjunction with other related guarantees, justice. Id.
192. Wright, supra note 184, at 13.
193. Rawls, supra note 190, at 43.
194. RAwLs, supra note 191, at 227.
195. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (using the 14th Amendment to find a fundamental right to
vote).
196. Id. at 565.
197. Rawls, supra note 190, at 78; see also RAwis, supra note 191, at 221-34.
198. See id.
199. See id.; see also Clines, supra note 9, and accompanying text.
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Preserving Representative Government

Another compelling government interest to be reinvestigated
holds that the time required to solicit donations at a pace consistent
with that of the rest of the political market detracts from the quality 2of
00
the representation we receive from the representatives themselves.
Further, in order to protect our right to representation we must protect the time representatives have to engage in our representation.
Critics of the role of money in politics have noted the advent of
what has been called the "war chest mentality"2 1 gripping politicians,
20
causing them to amass more and more money for the next battle. 1
Former Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater said of the spiraling costs
of campaign funding: "Unlimited campaign spending ...

causes the

elected officials to devote more time to raising money than to their
public duties. 20 3 This mentality causes representatives at all levels to
be concerned with the fundraising, not the day to day business of legislating: responding to constituents, gathering information about issues, debating and analyzing policy, and writing and speaking on
pieces of legislation.20
While this justification was not argued by the parties in Buckley,
it was discussed in committee when the F.E.C.A. was being developed.20 5 One of the government interests justified by the public funding provisions for congressional races was in fact the diversion of
candidate's efforts to non-representative duties. 0 6 This Senate report
is cited in Buckley, when the Court speaks' 2vaguely
to a need to "free
07
candidates from the rigors of fundraising.
Reynolds adds a modicum of support to the representative time
management argument as well.20 In Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren
held that "representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and
each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation
in the political processes of his State's legislative
,209
bodies.
200. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1284-85.
201. Id.
202. Herbert Alexander reported in 1992 that a senator had to raise $13,000 a week for
all six years of his term to reach the amount spent in one campaign. HERBERT E. Ai-ExANDER, FINANCING POLICS: MONEY, ELECrIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 78-81 (1992).
203. STERN, supra note 7, at 3.
204. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83.
205. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
206. See S. REP. No. 93-689, at 5 (1974).
207. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
208. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
209. Id.
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While a more extreme argument, the idea that elected politicians
who spend too much time raising funds for the next campaign are not
really representatives at all has basis in several of the fundamental
documents of the Nation. 210 First, the requirements of representation
are implicated in the Constitution. In Article I, section 2, the legislative powers granted to Congress in section 1 are "apportioned among
the Several States."'21 1 The Guarantee Clause that serves as a supplementary source of federal power also guarantees the representative
structure delineated in Article J.212
When representative-candidates spend as much time campaigning
as they do representing their constituency, a failure of representation
and a crisis of republicanism results.21 3 If we accept that politicians
are nervous about their political fortunes, the only way to prevent
them from being further "enslaved by their constant obsession with
fundraising" is to assure them of a minimum amount of disinterested

funding.2 14 Hence, the birth of public financing, partial or whole, tax-

based or not.
A Jeffersonian concept of representation, focusing on the virtue
of the electors who have risen through the meritocracy, would imagine
campaigning as a corruptive influence. 21 5 At the very least, a more
benign Madisonian view of representation giving more leeway to the
elected officials would see the current system of campaign finance as a
negative distraction.21 6
Republican notions of representation were earlier implicated by
the Court's decision in Colorado Republican."7 But the concept of
representation upheld in that ruling was much more rooted in the
party system.218 While parties serve a valuable purpose to the democratic republic,2 9 a better understanding of representation transcends
the party system.

210. Blasi, supra note 104, at 1283.
211. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
212. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
213. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1283.
214. STERN, supra note 7, at 181.
215. See, e.g., GARRET W. SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 78-82 (1991).
216. See GARRY WILLS, EXPLAm1NG AMEmCA: THE FEDERALIST 184-88 (1981).
217. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 116 S.Ct. at 2309.
218. Note, Leading Cases, 110 HARv.L. REv. 135, 241 (1996).
219. Nahra, supra note 44, at 57; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1984).
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Narrowly Tailored Full Public Funding: Maine's Clean
Election Act

Maine's Clean Election Act22 is still too young to be exhaustively
measured for success; however, its ambition is impressive. The Act
creates a general pool of money from which candidates will draw. The
pool is funded by a base of tax revenues augmented by funds from the
checkoff program, the "seed money" initially collected by candidates
during the qualifying period, voluntary independent donations to the
fund itself, and fines collected for noncompliance. 221 Its stated purpose is to finance gubernatorial, state senatorial and state representative campaigns. 2'
To qualify for public funding, a would-be candidate must officially declare her intent to participate, 2' at which point she can only
accept two categories of money: "seed money" contributions in varying amounts, depending on the race, 4 and qualifying contributions.2' Since the purpose of seed money is to enable would-be
candidates to qualify for public funding, it can only be accepted before
and during the qualifying period. For most candidates, this period extends from the beginning of November in the year preceding the election and ends on March 16 of the election year, before the party
22 7
primary. 6 "Unenrolled" independents can qualify until June.
Most importantly,
seed money must be spent during the qualifying
228
period.

Qualifying contributions must be in the amount of no more than
$5 in the form of a check or money order.22 9 Since their function is to
demonstrate support within the community for the candidate, the
quantity required is pegged to the relative size of the constituency
220. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1121 et seq. (West 1997). The ballot initiative,
I.B.5, was passed by the voters of the state of Maine on November 5, 1996, with 56%
approval, at which point the statute was added to the Maine Code. Nation Turns to
Maine's Campaign Reform Plan; But Challenges to the State's Clean Elections Initiative
May Suggest It's Still a Work in Progress,PORTLAND PREss HERALD, Mar. 17, 1997, at B1.
221. See title 21-A, §§ 1124(2)(A)-(D), (G), (H).
222. See title 21-A, §§ 1124(2)(A)-(D), (G), (H). The Act also provide that if a candidate drops out of a race or has unspent funds at the end of the campaign cycle, the funds
revert to the general fund. Id. § 1124(2)(E), (F). The pool is administered by a commissioner. See id. §§ 1124(2)(E), (F).
223. See id. § 1125(1).
224. See id. § 1125(2).
225. See id. 38 1125(3)(A)-(C).
226. See id. § 1125(8).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. § 1122(7)(A).
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represented. 2 °
Pending approval by the state election commission of the qualifying contributions as submitted, disbursement of public funds is immediate. The amount given to each candidate in a contested general
election race must equal the average of what each candidate spent in
similarly contested campaigns over the past two years.2 3 ' Candidates
in uncontested general elections do not qualify for funding, and candidates in uncontested primaries only qualify for an amount equal to the
past average. 2
After disbursement, candidates' behavior is regulated and monitored through reporting requirements.3 Significantly, the Act provides for matching funds to be given to the opponent or opponents of
a candidate who spends more than the distribution amount, in "an
additional amount equivalent to
the reported excess," up to twice
4
what was originally disbursed.3
The Act is not structured to address on its face the status of nonparticipant candidates." 5 Instead, it is presented as an "alternate" option; technically, it is an alternative to Maine's extant campaign laws,
also amended by the November 1996 referendum. Currently, contribution limits in Maine are capped at $1000 for individuals 236 and
$5000 for committees, corporations and associations. 23 7 When full
public financing begins in 1999, contributions both from individuals
and these groups will be limited to $500 for the gubernatorial race and
$250 for other races. 23 8 The voluntary expenditure limits already in
place remain.2 3 9
"[I]n some circumstances, what seems to be government regulation of speech actually might promote free speech, and should not be
treated as an abridgment at all .... [Moreover,] what seems to be
free speech in markets might, in some selected circumstances, amount
230. See id. § 1125(3). Thus, gubernatorial candidates need contributions from at a
minimum 2500 people, state senate candidates need support from at least 150 constituents,
and state representative candidates must receive money from 50 residents. Id.
231. See id. § 1125(8)(C).
232. See id. §§ 1125(8)(B), (D).
233. Id. § 1125(12).
234. See id. § 1125(9).
235. In related reporting requirement provisions, however, candidates who are not registered as receiving money from the Clean Election Fund are subject to accelerated reporting requirements and expedited deadlines for disclosing campaign spending totals. See id.
§§ 1017 (3-A(A), (F)).
236. Id. § 1015(1).
237. Id. § 1015(2).
238. Id. §§ 1015(1), (2).
239. Candidates who voluntarily limit their expenditures will now be placed on a published compliance list. Id. § 1015(7), (9).
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to an abridgment of free speech."24 Public funding has been called
the "ultimate in disinterested money" in a democracy since the funds
come from the people through the government and24is1 not identifiable
with special interest groups or wealthy individuals.
From its ill-timed arrival in the midst of gigantic deficit problems
to more recent disillusionment with any and all politicians, public
funding has not enjoyed widespread popularity even where it has been
implemented fully.242 At best, public reaction has been mixed. Responding to the same poll in which 9 out of 10 people said they
wanted major changes to campaign finance reform, only half of those
polled said that public financing would reduce the effects of special
interests; 43% said that it would not.243 Congressional public funding
to support the presidential public funding scheme was considered
within the original F.E.C.A. framework; the idea was rejected in 1971
and again in 1977.21 However, "what was sauce for the presidential
2 45
goose was not, it turned out, sauce for the congressional gander."
Prodded by its constituents, Congress has been slow to act once it
has dipped its toe into the proverbial waters of campaign finance reform,2 46 and the American public certainly has not demanded serious
Congressional consideration of public financing. 7 A 1990 survey indicates that American public opinion on public financing is at the very
least ambivalent and very clearly shallow, fluctuating with different
24 9
of
considerations.248 While a "plurality, perhaps even a majority"
Americans support such programs, two recessions and opposition to
"radical" change have kept public financing on shaky ground. 250
Generally, the implementation of public funding would require a
careful balance between two competing manifestations of democratic
interest. On the one hand, the minimum, or "floor," should be high
240. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BRL OF RIGHTS IN TE MODERN
STATE 255, 267 (1986).
241. Stem, supra note 7, at 180.
242. The Maine referendum passed with a bare 56% of the vote, with no organized
opposition prior to November 1996. Civil Liberties Group Challenges Campaign Law;
Other Groups and IndividualsJoin a Lawsuit Alleging Maine's Election FinanceInitiative is
Unconstitutional,PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 1, 1997, at B3.
243. See Clines, supra note 9, at Al.
244. See GARY C. JACOBSEN, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 207 (1980). The

idea was also considered in 1977, but despite widely-professed support, it never got out of
committee or filibuster in either house. See id.
245. Id. at 204.
246. "It's sorta like the term-limits issue," Rep. Christopher Shays said. "Nobody wants
to do anything that might hurt their job security." David Hess, Mixed Emotions Grip Congress as Campaign Reform Advances, SAN DIGo UNION-TRm., Feb. 3, 1996, at A24.
247. See Clines, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
248. See FRANK.J. SORAuF, INSmE CAw'AMN FINANCE 146 (1992) (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 146.
250. Alexander, supra note 106 at 8.
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enough to make spending private funds over and above that amount
of little consequence." At the same time, numerous "undemocratic"
consequences could result from too high of a bar- 2 "The line between an indictment whose acceptance is truly voluntary and one that
begins to verge on the coercive is a wavering one.""
Only now has this need to balance public financing's effects become a relevant constitutional inquiry. Maine's law avoids the pitfalls
that have hobbled other states' regulations: on a practical level, it
presents the public financing scheme as a primarily voluntary option,
albeit a "sweetened" one, and it directs the harshest consequences and
reforms at groups and associations. Structurally, it recognizes that
campaign finance implicates a First Amendment right of speech by
requiring candidates to seek qualifying contributions as well as support within each district. The provision of matching funds to publiclyfunded candidates whose opponents fail to play by the rules merely
brings the public-funding candidate to the level of her opponent and
does not punish the opponent outright. In short, Maine has learned
her lessons from less radical reforms (and the court decisions eliminating them) in states such as Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri and
Wisconsin.
"As Maine goes, so goes the nation." In the nineteenth century,
prior to the establishment of a nationalized federal election day in
November, Maine voted in September, before the rest of the country.-54 Similarly, the public funding provisions of the Clean Election
Act bring Maine to the vanguard of electoral politics once again.
VI.

Conclusion

The Court's jurisprudential trend concerning First Amendmentprotected political speech is toward maintaining a nearly-impregnable
level of scrutiny. This level of protection is inconsistent with public
demand for change, and is not necessary to sustain constitutional integrity or even strict scrutiny. First, a balance between two strong
constitutional interests is perhaps the best way to protect the interests'
existence at all.-5 And second, this vision is near-myopic in its failure
to take into account that which earlier Courts articulated in Buckley
and Austin.
251. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign FinanceReform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1086 (1996).
252. See id. Smith lists three consequences: removal of legislative monitoring (because
there would be no incentives), a rise in the frequency of outright corruption, and the shifting of power from one group of elites to another. Id. at 1086.
253. Frederick Schauer, Statement Regarding the Constitutionality of S.1219 (May 8,
1996) (transcript available on LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST file)
254. Salmagundi, BALMOnm EvEcNNG SUN, Oct. 20, 1992, at A16.
255. Sunstein, supra note 240, at 268.
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Congress' inability to act on what is now a near-universal plea to
fix a faulty system is also inconsistent with demand for reform. 6 For
decades, campaign finance reform has remained on the back burner,
often for congressionally self-interested purposes. Consequently, the
resulting failures since the Buckley Court "gutted" the F.E.C.A. have
been almost entirely masked. 25 7 It has been2 argued that Congress has
"created a false appearance of regulation.""
Recent activity in the
105th Congress illustrates this well: of all the bills proposed recently,
not one has been passed. Complaints about inaction now are being
volleyed from all sides.
Buckley's poorly worded per curiam decision constrains any radical movement in this area of law. 9 Still, giving up entirely on the
Buckley framework may not be necessary. The Buckley Court relied
solely on corruption to justify the F.E.C.A., but it recognized the possibility of "ancillary" interests. Without overturning Buckley altogether, 60 new justifications and public financing are the best option
for reform.

Shifting to more solid ground in the realm of justifications can
take two forms. First, the Court could recognize, on the strength of
Buckley alone, the existence of non-corruption interests like equality
of access and the less radical preservation of representative government. Equality of access is unlikely to succeed as a justification more
for political than constitutional reasons. Preservation of the integrity
of representative government by protecting legislators' time to legislate has the strongest constitutional and pragmatic bases of the government interests proposed to supplement corruption. Properly
256. The 104th Congress came closer to reform in 1996 than at any other time in recent
memory with S.1219, the McCain-Feingold bill. A bipartisan proposal, McCain-Feingold
offered inducements to candidates to accept limits on spending in the form of reduced ad
rates and postage. But S.1219 was filibustered to death on June 10, 1996, when an attempt
to close debate failed by 6 votes. Democrats voted 46-1 to end the filibuster; Republicans
voted 8-45. See Vote Report and Bill Tracking, Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of
1996, S. 1219, 104th Cong., 2d Sess (1996). After campaign finance controversies surrounding the 1996 election, the Democratic National Committee, President Clinton and Asia, the
New York Times reported a resurgence of support for the bill. See Dane Strother, Campaign Finance 'Reforms' Don't Work, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 1, 1997, at A13.
257. See Nahra, supra note 44, at 48. Nahra argues that Congress has "created the false
appearance of regulation." Id. at 57.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25, at 59. Miller, after citing the past failures of constitutional amendment efforts by term limits supporters, flag-burning opponents, and equal
rights supporters, notes the legal problem that could result from a campaign finance Constitutional amendment: "[A]n amendment that truly limited all independent expenditures
could well threaten legitimate First Amendment rights." Id.
260. An unlikely occurrence in the foreseeable future, given the support it finds among
a majority of the current justices. See ColoradoRepublican, 518 U.S. 604, xxx, 116 S.Ct. at
2312-20.
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alleged and supported, it might succeed as its own justification. As an
argument based on the Guarantee Clause, it would likely be insulated
from court scrutiny by the potential applicability of the political question doctrine.
Secondly, evolution within the concept of corrpution itself is still
possible. Corruption survives recent state and federal interpretations
of that compelling interest. With no clearly established definition and
muddled precedents, its future is nearly unpredictable. It could be
expanded to weave in elements of either the equal access justification
or the representative government protection rationale.
It has been suggested the Court will take action when more states
develop public financing schemes citing more currently applicable
government interests. 2 61 If so, the outcome will depend on whether
the Court is willing to forcibly evolve its interpretation of the First
Amendment in this context and expand its conception of interests beyond the avoidance of corruption identified in Buckley and recast in
Austin.
As of early 1998, twenty-two states are considering new reform
packages. 2 62 While some state campaign and electoral "reforms" are
simply a loosening of PAC requirements under the guise of political
speech protection,2 63 others are unlike anything ever attempted.2 6 4
Frustrated by the federal courts' decisions, Missouri has given up on
contribution limits, and a groundswell of support for public financing
has begun. 2 65 Public financing possesses several advantages as a po261. See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, ELECrIoN LAW, supra note 12, at 782.
262. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin
are all discussing bills introduced in the last 18 months, according to a Westlaw search. Of
the states discussed in this note, three are debating the merits of proposed legislation,
sometimes in both houses of the state legislature. The 1998 Regular Session of the Kentucky House is considering H.R. 63, 167, 173, and the state senate is considering S. 194. In
Missouri, the 89th Assembly is considering bills no. 407, 779 and 1052. In Wisconsin, the
93rd Regular Session Senate is debating S. 7, while the state assembly considers bills no.
207, 937 and 1950.
263. Texas Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson's proposal from last session, S.
179, exempts some PACs from reporting requirements and decreases the contribution limit
for multicandidate political committees. S. 179, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996).
264. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Couponsfor Democracy: an Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1996). Hasen proposes a voucher system whereby every voter would receive some federal campaign
vouchers to be given directly to a candidate's campaign fund or to interest groups. See id.
Egalitarian government interests would justify the system constitutionally. See id. at 42.
265. Patrick Harvey, Political CampaignsMust Be Cleaned Up With Public Financing;
Limits On Spending Would Be Effective Reform, in ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, Nov. 26,
1996, at B13; see also Ellen S. Miller, Run Elections with Clean Money, ST. Louis PoSTDISPATCH, Feb. 9, 1998, at B7.
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tential reform; its first and foremost strength is its ready-made approval by language throughout Buckley.2 6 6 After Maine's first full
implementation in 2000, the practicality of public financing will be
more mainfest.
At the Nation's birth, the Framers emphasized the highest quality
of representation, debating how to achieve it in every facet of the
Constitution itself.26 7 Today the phenomenon of potential candidates
268
eschewing public service for fear of increases in campaign demands

weakens representative government. Outbreaks of factious behavior
are a warning that the Constitution's delicate balance is in a precarious state. In the interest of protecting the democratic republic, we
must reexamine our government's true interests to end threatening

outbreaks.

266. See 424 U.S. at 92-93 (public financing characterized as an effort "not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge discussion and participation in the public process, goals vital to a self-governing people"); id. at
96 ("Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving
major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions").
Note that language in the latter could be used to support the principle of protecting the
integrity of representative government by minimizing distractions.
267. Blasi, supra note 104, at 1302.
268. Richard. L. Berke, Run For Congress? Parties Find Rising Stars Are Just Saying
No, N.Y. TiaEs, Mar. 15, 1998, at 1. "The emphasis is too much on fund-raising, and that's
not what led me to run in the first place," said one former New York congressman who
decided not to challenge for his old seat. Id. at 20.
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